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Abstract. The European General Data Protection Regulation asserts
data subjects’ right to be forgotten, i.e., their right to request that all
their personal data be deleted from an organizations’ data stores. How-
ever, fulfilling such requests in large-scale systems is technically challeng-
ing. It requires that organizations keep track of all locations in which an
individual’s data is stored, be able to access and delete it in a reasonable
time frame, and be able to prove that all such data was in fact deleted.
In addition, organizations must cope with complexities such as multiple,
distributed, and continuously evolving systems of record, complex data
retention policies and deletion approval workflows. We present a first de-
sign pattern and practical implementation of the right to be forgotten
on a large scale in Big Data and cloud environments.
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1 Introduction
The European General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR)4, which went into
effect in May 2018, replacing the previous Data Protection Directive from 1995.
According to the GDPR, personal data is defined as “any information relat-
ing to an identified or identifiable natural person”, called the data subject. The
regulation distinguishes between two key roles: the data controller and the data
processor. The data controller is the person, public authority, agency or any other
body (e.g., company) which determines the purposes and means of the process-
ing of personal data. The data processor is a person, public authority, agency or
any other body that processes personal data on behalf of the controller.
Article 17 of this regulation defines the “right to erasure”, also referred to
as the “right to be forgotten”: a data subject, under certain conditions, shall
have the right to obtain from the data controller the erasure of personal data
concerning him or her without undue delay. The Article additionally states that
the right to erasure does not apply if further processing of the data is necessary
4 https://www.eugdpr.org/
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to fulfill a legal obligation, for purposes that are in the public interest, or for the
defense of legal claims. Such a situation may arise if another law or regulation
prevents the deletion of certain data. For example, in the financial industry, a
European regulation called MiFID II5 requires that transaction details be kept
for at least five years.
According to Article 19 of the GDPR, the controller is required to communi-
cate any such erasure request to each recipient to whom the personal data have
been disclosed, so that they may erase it as well. This means that the right to
erasure also applies to data processors.
Being able to fulfill such erasure requests is technically very challenging. It
requires organizations to keep track of all locations in which an individual’s
personal data is stored, including derived data (data that was computed based
on raw data collected from the subject). For each such data they must determine
whether it should be deleted or one of the exemptions set out in the regulation
apply. In addition, organizations must be able to find and delete all relevant data
within a reasonable time frame, usually one to two months, and be able to prove
that all data was in fact deleted. If part of the data cannot be deleted for one of
the above-mentioned reasons, this must also be documented and communicated
to the data subject when replying to their request.
Existing solutions mostly tackle the challenge of the deletion process itself,
verifying that the data is securely deleted and cannot be restored, wihtout deal-
ing with actually identifying and finding which data to delete. Another set of
solutions relies on simple string matching or regular expressions to locate the
data of an individual. For example, for a person named John Doe with the na-
tional identifier 12345 and email address j@email.com, these solutions simply
search within data stores for those (or similar) strings. Clearly, not all personal
data can be so easily located, as it may have been pseudonymized and no longer
associated with the person’s original identifiers.
While the above examples address various aspects of the deletion problem,
no solution that we know of tackles the end-to-end challenge of the data deletion
lifecycle in highly complex and distributed systems. This includes locating data
across multiple systems and instances, retention policies that may override the
right to erasure, evidence retention, and audit logging. This end-to-end lifecycle
becomes a critical problem in Big Data environments where systems are geo-
graphically dispersed, constantly evolving and are typically owned and operated
by different groups or business units. Moreover, these systems serve different
purposes and thus may require different approaches for implementing deletion
procedures.
In this paper, we present a novel, practical solution to implement the right to
be forgotten in large-scale Big Data, cloud environments. We introduce a reusable
design pattern for recording and registering erasure requests, launching deletion
processes across multiple systems, tracking their progress until completion, and
issuing a report including details on what data was deleted. The framework
5 https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/markets-financial-instruments-mifid-ii-directive-
2014-65-eu en
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is described in detail in Section 3 of this paper. We then present a practical
implementation of the framework in a real IBM product. The details of this
implementation are described in Section 4, which also includes insights on the
challenges encountered and the design decisions that were made. Finally, we
conclude our work and outline future work directions in Section 5.
2 Related work
One area that has been pursued in connection with the right to erasure is the
issue of secure deletion, i.e., making sure the deleted data cannot be restored.
Works in this area include TrueErase [2], FullPP [3] and Multi-User Secure Dele-
tion [4]. The Ephemerizer [5] uses encryption to manage data access and Vanish
[6] uses Distributed Hash Tables to automatically expire data after a defined time
period. Commercial solutions include Eraser6 and Certus Erasure7. Velupillai et
al. [7] provide an evaluation of different file shredding software programs for the
Windows operating system.
Other facets of the GDPR have also been widely researched and implemented.
A multitude of companies offer tools for personal data discovery and classifica-
tion, including Microsoft R©data discovery tools8 and the IBM R© StoredIQ Suite9.
Academic works on this topic include a tool for classifying enterprise data using
Semantic Web technologies [8], as well as many works on document classification
[9,10]. Recent solutions such as MinerEye10 use artificial intelligence to identify
and classify sensitive data.
Consent management solutions are quite abundant, both in the literature
and in the commercial arena. Early works include the Encore project [11] and
Smart Notices [12]. More recent works include DPCM [1], SPECIAL [14] and
Semantic Based Consent Model [13]. Commercial solutions include Symphonic11,
OneTrust R©12, and more. The OneTrust solution also includes a portal that data
subjects can use to submit their erasure requests. The portal notifies process
owners of the requests and automatically communicates the responses to data
subjects, alongside generating compliance reports. However, it does not cover
the process of actual deletion from the organizations’ systems and data stores.
Another set of tools is designed to monitor all data accesses to ensure they
are compliant with policies and to prevent data breaches. Such tools include
IBM Security Guardium R©13 and Imperva R© SecureSphere R©14. Enterprise cloud
6 https://eraser.heidi.ie/
7 https://www.certus.software/en/
8 https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/security/how-to-discover-classify-personal-
data-azure
9 https://www.ibm.com/us-en/marketplace/ibm-storediq-suite
10 https://minereye.com/
11 http://www.symphonicsoft.com/solution/
12 https://onetrust.com/products/gdpr-compliance/
13 https://www.ibm.com/security/data-security/guardium
14 https://www.imperva.com/products/data-security/data-protection/
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providers have also started to implement activity monitoring and audit capabil-
ities, e.g., Amazon R© AWS CloudTrail15, and IBM Cloud Activity tracker16.
Forsberg in his thesis [15] suggested the use of a System Information and Event
Management (SIEM) or log management solution to monitor all access to files
containing regulated data.
Another approach is to use information-flow techniques to track the flow of
personal or sensitive information within applications and ensure it is properly
used. The Decentralized Information Flow Control model [16], RIFLE [17] and
TaintDroid [18] and its many successors fall under this category.
Additional work [19] includes a description of how Google R© and other search
engines implemented the right to be forgotten in the aftermath of the famous
Google Spain verdict in 2014. However, this report only describes what the
right to erasure looks like from the end-user’s perspective, e.g., the portal for
submitting requests, what questions need to be answered, etc. It does not provide
insight about how this was implemented by Google behind the scenes. Moreover,
this example only covers the removal of specific URLs from search results, not
the removal of all personal data.
Malle et al. [20] tackled the issue of the right to be forgotten from a different
perspective, seeking to determine whether existing machine learning techniques
could be effective when applied on anonymized data, thus exempting it from the
need to be erased. They tested four classifiers, running them on an initial dataset
and then on purturbed versions of it, and recording the impact on the quality
of the classification result. As expected, the accuracy declined significantly in
all tested algorithms, leading the authors to the conclusion that anonymizing
data before applying classification is not a viable solution for most use cases.
ROBUST-STREAMING [21] is a resilient streaming algorithm aimed at solving
the problem of summarizing a dynamic data stream while enabling users to
restrict the service provider from using their data at any time.
O’Hara [22] proposed a Semantic Web based approach for implementing the
right to be forgotten. However, that proposal is more of a high-level discus-
sion than a concrete technical solution. Sarkar et al. [23] present the research
challenges in facilitating the erasure of data as per the right to erasure and
propose some technical solutions for those challenges. The two main challenges
they identified were identification of data replication and designing distributed
data erasure algorithms. As possible solutions they propose exploiting operating
system capabilities, tainting methods, encryption-based erasure techniques, and
”eventual erasure” for hard-to-access locations. However, they did not present
an actual implementation.
The main research gap remains how to locate and track all places where a
person’s data is stored (including derived data), determine which ones can and
should be deleted, delete the data across many, distributed systems, track the
deletion process and be able to report on it in a timely manner. This is a very
15 https://aws.amazon.com/cloudtrail/
16 https://www.ibm.com/cloud/activity-tracker
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complex problem, encompassing many challenges, some of which are solved by
our framework and some remain future work.
3 The data deletion framework
In this section, we present a design pattern for managing and executing data
subject erasure requests. This pattern was designed to be as generic as possible,
to support different types of IT systems and easily add new ones if needed. It
was also designed to support erasure requests not only for a specific data subject
but also for entire applications or lines of business, thus making it reusable for
additional use cases such as fulfilling contractual obligations between companies
transferring data from one to the other for business purposes.
The framework has three main building blocks: 1. A System and Data
Registry to maintain the information about where data is stored and how to
delete it. 2. A Workflow Engine in which erasure requests are created, tracked,
and documented. 3. An Execution Engine for managing and triggering deletion
jobs. The overall architecture of the solution can be seen in Figure 1. On the
top are the three main components of the solution, and on the bottom are the
individual systems where deletion is performed. In the following sub-sections, we
provide more details on each of these components.
Fig. 1. High-level architecture of the data deletion solution
3.1 System and Data Registry
The System and Data Registry maps the different data items to the systems in
which they are stored, and holds additional operational information to support
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automatic and scalable deletion execution. The registry contains definitions of
the various data usage purposes, for example, research, authentication, malware
detection, etc. It also includes the types of personal data collected and stored in
the systems, for example IP address, geo-location, device profile, and so forth.
The different system types are also defined. Each system type can be linked to
one or more data types that are stored in it and one or more data usage purposes.
Finally, all production systems used to store and process personal data are
registeredy. Each such system is an instantiation of one of the system types that
were previously defined. Thus, several identical systems instantiated in different
data centers, spanning different geographies, are supported. For each system,
its name, geographic location, data center identifier, and additional details such
as the system owner and business owner are stored. For each system, relevant
information on how to trigger the actual deletion is also documented.
Each system can also be linked to a retention policy that states for how long
data should be stored on the system. For example, a policy could indicate that
data should be stored for 30 days, 90 days, or one year, or for the duration of
a certain contract between two parties. These retention policies can be used to
implement an automatic deletion tool for ”expired data”, whose retention period
has passed. Retention policies can also be linked to a specific purpose, e.g., for
systems with more than one purpose, data used for different purposes could have
different retention periods.
3.2 Workflow Engine
The second building block is a Workflow Engine, used to define the deletion
lifecycle, track deletion progress, retain evidence, and log information for audit-
ing purposes. To initiate the process a deletion request is created and logged.
Requests can be issued manually, by a person, or automatically via code invoca-
tion (e.g., triggering the creation of a deletion request via an API). Such requests
must indicate the user to be deleted. User identification can be done by various
mechanisms such as a unique user ID, an email address, etc.
Depending on how the task workflow is configured, it may require review
or approval by one or more people before it goes to the execution stage. It
may also involve a process for checking whether the data should not be deleted
due to one of the exemptions set out in Article 17 of the GDPR, e.g., further
processing of the data is required for exercising the right of freedom of expression
and information; compliance with a legal obligation; archiving purposes in the
public interest, scientific or historical research purposes; or for the establishment,
exercise or defence of legal claims. In the case of health related data, it may also
be retained for public health reasons.
The request then proceeds to the execution phase. As the deletion process is
expected to span multiple systems, a sub-task is created to track the progress of
the deletion on each individual system from which data needs to be deleted. In
some systems a deletion request may not complete instantly and may take hours
or even days to process. When each system-level deletion request terminates,
evidence that the system performed the deletion is attached to the sub-task,
Forgotten @ Scale 7
demonstrating either successful execution of the request, failure to delete due to
an error, or confirmation that no data matching the search criteria was found.
Each such sub-task is then marked as completed. Once all sub-tasks are complete,
the overall master task can be closed, either automatically or following a human
review.
In addition to managing this workflow, the Workflow Engine also serves as an
audit trail retention system, as each system sub-task is augmented with execution
evidence. The evidence collected during the deletion process can be supplied to
the data subject or to an auditor, to show that the deletion steps were executed
successfully. The Workflow Engine also allows users to view the deletion tasks’
status and register to receive notifications upon events such as task creation,
approval, or termination.
3.3 Execution Engine
The Execution Engine serves as a data deletion job launcher and tracker and is
used to trigger the actual deletion tasks in an automatic manner. A job is run
periodically to check for new erasure requests in the Workflow Engine that are
ready for execution. For each such request, the job queries the registry to get
the list of production systems from which data needs to be deleted, along with
the deletion commands that need to be run for each system. Deletion commands
are invoked using an API implemented by the system; the API can either be
externalized using HTTP or invoked by running a jar file or script, optionally
with certain parameters.
Since different systems have different deletion logic and requirements, the
ability of system owners to develop and own a proper deletion mechanism for
their system is crucial. In addition, in typical cloud deployments, identical sys-
tems are often instantiated in different geographies. As a result, a deletion func-
tion developed for one system can be reused (or reused with small variations)
across multiple regions.
For each relevant system, the Execution Engine first opens a sub-task in
the Workflow Engine to represent the specific system-level deletion task. It then
runs the relevant deletion commands and waits to receive acknowledgement from
the system that the task has been completed. Eventually, when the system-level
deletion is complete, the system informs the Execution Engine of the completion
and sends any relevant evidence. Such evidence may be a snippet from a log file,
the response or return code of the command, and so forth. The Execution Engine
then attaches the evidence to the appropriate sub-task and marks it as complete.
4 IBM use case
IBM offers many different products and solutions to its clients, including middle-
ware, software and cloud-based services in the areas of cloud computing, artificial
intelligence, commerce, data and analytics, Internet of Things (IoT), mobile, and
security. As a data processor, IBM may receive erasure requests from its clients,
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the data controllers, concerning certain data subjects and must comply with
those requests.
One of IBM Security’s products is a large scale Software-as-a-Service (SaaS)
product, spanning multiple geographies and consisting of thousands of servers,
hundreds of databases, implemented using multiple technologies. The remainder
of this paper is focused on the solution put in place for this specific product.
In this implementation, a Data Policy and Consent Manager (DPCM) [1]
instance was used as the System and Data Registry, and for storing the data
retention policies that may, in some cases, override the erasure request; Jira R©17
was used as the Workflow Engine; and a Jenkins R©18 instance, augmented with
proprietary deletion management code, was used as the Execution Engine. The
implementation of these components follows the conceptual framework described
in Section 3. An additional Management component was also implemented to
manage the specific deletion jobs for each target system.
IBM implemented the system-specific deletion tools in a unified manner,
using plugins that can be downloaded and executed on a target system. The
plugins can be jar files or python modules containing code that implements
the deletion logic. All plugins are hosted in a central repository to enable easy
maintenance and updates of the code if necessary. A more detailed execution
flow of the deletion process can be found in Figure 2. The following sub-sections
elaborate on some aspects of the implementation.
4.1 DPCM component
The Data Policy and Consent Management tool [1] was designed to manage
many aspects related to the policies governing the use of data in the enterprise.
It includes tools for modeling and storing privacy policies and user consent;
mechanisms for certifying the purpose(s) of an application; and a policy decision
engine that handles the data access logic. The decision engine helps determine
whether a data item can be accessed in a certain context. This engine processes
all policies applicable to the data access, and as a result can either approve the
access, deny the access or check whether the data subject(s) gave consent and
approve/deny based on that. Another possible response coould be that the data
must be obfuscated (masked or redacted in some way) before being used for the
requested purpose. To support the right to erasure, only a subset of DPCM’s
capabilites are used.
For each system, the relevant information on how to trigger the actual dele-
tion is documented in DPCM. In this case, the information includes a URL to
the relevant Management system, the name of the plugin to download, and the
relevant plugin configuration for that target system. Thus, similar systems may
reuse the same plugins but run them with different configurations.
DPCM’s policies can be used to describe additional rules that apply to the
data, and may, in some cases, override the deletion request. For example, a policy
17 https://www.atlassian.com/software/jira
18 https://jenkins.io/
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Fig. 2. IBM’s data deletion flow
can state that transaction data must be stored for five years (as in the example
given earlier). In this case, when calling DPCM’s decision engine to request
approval for deleting a person’s past transactions, if the data’s timestamp is less
than five years old, the API will return a response of ’deny’, stating that the
decision was made based on the above policy. This response can then be returned
to the Execution Engine to be logged with the deletion request.
4.2 Jenkins component
This component is based on the open source Jenkins automation server software.
A Jenkins job is run periodically to check for new erasure requests (tickets) in
Jira that are ready for execution. For each such ticket, it queries DPCM to get
the list of systems from which data needs to be deleted, along with the deletion
commands that need to be run for each one. These commands, in turn, are sent to
a Management component that communicates with the individual systems. The
deletion request includes additional information taken from the system record
in DPCM, such as the plugin URL and plugin config, which are used by the
Management component to trigger the deletion job (see Section 4.3).
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4.3 Management component
The Management component is in charge of managing the specific deletion jobs
for each target system. It also manages the access credentials for the systems it
is resposible for. The Management component receives a deletion request from
Jenkins for a specific user ID (or business ID if the request is to delete an entire
business), along with the list of systems retrieved from DPCM.
For each system, the Management component generates a job containing
all relevant information to perform the deletion. Each system’s deletion tool
polls the Management system periodically to discover new deletion jobs that are
waiting to be executed, and initiates the execution. Long deletion processes are
broken into multiple execution steps, after each one of which the plugin reports
its status as ”in progress”.
Eventually, when the deletion is complete, the plugin informs the Manage-
ment component that the task has been completed and sends along any relevant
evidence.
4.4 Challenges in the Solution Implementation
The first challenge we encountered was dealing with online, highly available
systems. Since running delete operations on a database may significantly impact
its performance, we had to plan the solution such that it would not degrade these
systems’ performance or availability. This was done by enabling the deletion
plugins to delay execution of the deletion command if needed, for example if the
current load on the system is above a certain threshold.
The second challenge we dealt with was systems that perform intensive data
loading operations. For example, a system may be populated by periodically
running an Extract-Transform-Load (ETL) job that loads large quantities of
data into the datastore. To prevent deletion jobs from interfering with the ETL
job, and thus slowing down the system, we included some orchestration logic
that ensures that the data population and data deletion jobs don’t run at the
same time.
The last challenge we will discuss is updates to the deletion logic, which may
be required when changes are introduced to systems (such as a change in the
DB schema). To support this type of change, we designed the solution such that
plugins are loaded dynamically from a central repository upon execution of a
deletion job. Thus, if a new version of a plugin is required, one simply needs to
upload the new version to the repository and update the appropriate record in
the System Registry. When the next deletion job is triggered, the new plugin
logic will automatically be downloaded and run.
5 Conclusion and future work
We presented a reusable design for the automatic management and execution
of requests for erasure of personal data in large-scale, evolving, data-intensive
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cloud-based environments. Besides saving time and preventing mistakes, this so-
lution also makes it easy to track the progress of requests, see if/where things are
stuck, and immediately remediate any issue to enable their timely completion.
This is very important, especially in complex environments where data may be
distributed over many different systems and datastores in many geographic lo-
cations. In addition, evidence of the deletion process execution is automatically
documented and attached to the request, making it easy to retrieve in case of
an inquiry or audit.
Moreover, we demonstrated that this design is useful not only for compliance
with data protection regulations but also for additional use cases such as ad-
herence to business agreements between companies. A similar framework, with
minor tweaks, could even be used to fulfill the GDPR’s right to data portability
(Article 20), by replacing the deletion commands with data retrieval commands.
There are a few more steps in the process that could be automated. These
include the automatic creation of Jira tickets upon receiving erasure requests and
automatic replies to data subjects whose requests are complete. Another area for
future development is implementing more complex data retention policies that
enable setting minimum and maximum retention periods, checking those against
erasure requests, and enable adding future deletion tasks to be executed when
the retention period passes.
In our current implementation it was assumed that all user data should be
deleted, regardless of the purpose for which it was collected. It could however be
extended to enable purpose-specific deletion by using additional functionality of
the DPCM component. For example, a user could request that only data used
for marketing be removed, whereas data used for product support remain stored
in the system.
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